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The share of financialintermediaries in nationalwealth will be studied at two levels. Thefirst is the determinationin thisSCCLIO of the share of financialintermediaries' holdings intotal amounts outstanding of selectedassets and liabilities. Thesecond is the comparison to be made inSection 4 of the totalassets of financial intermediaries withan appropriate nationalaggregate. The first comparisonis presented inreasonable detail for United Statesgovernment securities, states andlocalgovernment securities, corporateand foreign bonds,preferred andcommrni stock, andmortgage loans but ina much more summaryfashion for short-term loansand tangibleassets held by financialinter- mediaries, as wellas for their liabilitiesand equity. Thecom- parison thus omitscash andmiscellaneous assetsand liabilities. This may bejustified first by thefact that atmost benchmark dates cash andmiscellaneousassets represent less thanone-fifth of the totalassets of financialintermediaries. Moreimportant is the fact that theomitted cashassets Consist largelyof items (cur- rency, bank deposits,items inprocess of Collection)representing mostly transactionsbetween financialintermediariesComparisoi with the rest ofthe economyis, thereforeof little interest.The miscellaneousassets (as well asmiscellaneous liabilities)are gen- erally too smalland too littleexplored towarrant or permit sig- nificant statisticalcomparisons
The mainresults of thesecomparisons aresummarized in Tables 9 and 10.The first ofthese is limitedto three dates 1900, 1929, and1949- but shows estimatesfor abouta dozen
50TABlE 9
Share of Financia' Intermediaries inSelected Assets
(per cent)
TABLE 10





















1900 54 60 35 8 55
1912 67 54 36 10 66
1922 38 52 43 13 62
1929 52 54 48 14 67
1933 68 56 44 21 64
1939 80 69 66 23 70
1945 69 78 71 21 68
1949 69 77 86 24 72
19(Y) 1920 1919
I Tangible assets (land and structures) 2 2 1
2 Short-terni loans 35 45 40
3 Mortgage loans 55 67 72
Farm 37 59 67
Nonfarm 65 69 72
4 Bonds
United States government 54 52 69
State and local government 60 54 77
Corporate and foreign 35 48 86
5 Domestic stocks 8 14 24
Preferred 7 19 37
Common 8 14 22
6 All securities 23 26 58
7 Bonds and mortgages 47 56 72
8 Mortgages and securities 31 33 59
9 Mortgages, securities, and tangible assets 12 17 30S
types of individual assets and combinations of them. Thesecon(l
gives figures for all eight benchmark dates hut onlyfor the five
types of assets for which the required dataarc available. The
two tables show that the share of financial imcrincdiaijeshas in-
creased over the last half century in eight of thenine main forms
of assets that can be compared with therelevant natioiialtotal
with a reasonable degree of confidence.The only exceptionis
tangible assets (land, buildings, andequipment) which, ofcourse,
are of very small importance for financialintermediaries. The
share of financial intermediarieshas increased 1)0th l)CtWCdfl1900
and 1929 and between 1929and 1949 in all assetsexcept United
States government andstate and local securities between 1900and
1929, and short-term loans between1929 and 1949.
The share of financialintermediaries' holdings is foundto be
highest for corporate andgovernment bonds and mortgage loans,
and relatively low- although still substantialfor short-term
loans and stocks. Theincrease in the share of financialintermedi-
aries during the first halfof the century has beenmost pronounced
in corporate bondsand smallest in short-term loans.18
If the seven types of loansand securities (excludingshort-term loans) are combined, Le.if the ratiosal-c weighted by totalout- standing for the differenttypes of assets, the share offinancial intermediaries is seento have risen rather slowlyfrom slightly over 30 percent in 1900to alniost 35 per cent in1929, but to have increased muchmore rapidly during thefollowing two decades to reach 60 percent in 1949. If thecomparison is extendedto cover tangible assets, whichare almost insignificant forfInancial intermediaries butvery important ona national scale, the weighted share of financialintermediaries is natni-allymitch smaller, but the trend remains thesame as for their share inloans and securi- ties. It rises slowlyfrom slightlyover 10 per centat the turn of the century to almost20 per cent in 1929and rather rapidlyto 30 per cent in 1949.
'8That the share offinancial intermediaries inUnited Staesgovernment securities outstanding failed to risegreatly between 1900and 1949 nOtwithstafl(lingthe enormous increase in the absolute
amount of holdings of UnitedStates government Securities by financialintermediaries is dueto the fact that in 1000a large part of the then very small federaldebt was held bynational banks tosecure circulation.
52CHART6
Share of Financial Intermedarjes in selected Assets, 1900 and 1949
Corporote and foreign bonds
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United States government securities
Both in 1900 and 1912 most of the United States government securi-
ties outstanding were held by financial intermediaries (Table 11).
This is not of gi-eat significance since at that time the (Iebt of the
United States government was very small relative to both na-
tional income and the assets of financial intermediaries, and
most of the institutional holdings were accounted for by bonds
acquired to serve as the base of currency issued by the na-
tional banks. The decline of the share of financial intermediaries
to 38 per cent in 1922 reflected both a large increase in absolute
holdings and still more substantial sales of Treasury securities
to individuals and other noninstinitional holders during World





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2cial intermediaries in 1922 about one-half were in the hands of
commercial banks, now, liowevr, predominantly as secondary re-
serves or as investments rather than as cover for notes. Substari-
tial holdings of United States government securities - 4 to 5 per
cent of the total amounts outstandingwere shown by three
other groups of financial intermediaries, mutual savings banks,
life insurance companies, and personal trust departments. Most of
these holdings were acquired during World War I.
Developments between 1922 and 1929 are interesting. A com-
bination of net debt retirement by the Treasury; maintenance of
holdings, at least in the aggregate, by financial intermediaries;
and heavy sales or redemptions by noninstitutional holders con-
tributed to increase the share of financial intermediaries in total
United States government securities outstanding to slightly over
50 per cent in 1929. Virtually the entire increase was attributable
to a small rise in the holdings of commercial banks in the face of a
much larger expansion of their total assets and a reduction by
over one-fifth in the federal debt outstanding and to the first
stages of the substantial accumulation of Treasury securities by
government pension and trust funds. Smaller increases by other
groups of financial intermediaries (e.g. the Federal Reserve banks,
property insurance companies, personal trust departments, and
investment companies) were offset by a decline of the share of
Treasury securities held by mutual savings banks and by life in-
surance companies, which reflected sharp reductions - together
from 9 to51/2per cent of total federal debt - in both absolute
amounts and proportion of total assets.
The share of financial intermediaries continued to increase
during the next decade even though the total United States gov-
ernment debt outstanding more than doubled. Indeed, both be-
tween 1929 and 1933 and between 1933 and 1939, financial inter-
mediaries accounted for virtually the entire increase in Treasury
securities outstanding. As a result their share in total government
debt outstanding increased from slightly over 50 per cent to 80
per cent.
The experience of World War I was repeated between 1939 and
1945. Although financial intermediaries absorbed two-thirds of
55the total increase in the federaldebtand almost quintupledtheir
holdings (see Table 12), the shareof financial intermediariesin
total debt Outstanding decreasedfrom 80 to about 70per cent. In the fouryears after 1 945 the share of financialintermediaries' holdings of United Statesgovernment securities remained the
same. This was in markedcontrast to developments afterWorld War I; after WorldWar 11, individual holdersas a whole did not
reduce their holdings ofUnited Statesgovernment securities, and
nonllnancjal corporationseveti increased them, partlyas a ready
reserve against tax liabilities.
TABLE12
Share of FinancialIntermediaries in Changes inAmounts Outstanding of Selected Major Assets
(per cent)°
17/-1913-1!173-1930-1934.1940-1946.lik)1. 1912/9227020/0331.039l9 /94010.1.0
IU. S. gots.securit-S 273 36 3103 93 6770 69 2 State & localgovt. ecIIritjs 50 50 58 61512 31 75 78 3 Corporate & foreignbonds 37 55 56127 55 45119 96 4 Alt stock
11 17 15 9 30 16lOg 25 5 Preferrstock 12 35 22 0 38 66 44 43 6Comlnonstock 10 15 15 10 31 15177 23 7 All mortgages
81 59 7487 26188 77 74 8 Nonfarmmortgages 6 66 67107 32 18 78 73 OFarm mortgages 850 4147 19 90 49 90 10 Short-term loans 54 3433 41 50 39 41 Avcrage(Median,disre-
garding sign, of 1, 2,3,
4,8,9, & 10) 58 50 41 61 41 45 75 73 Weighted average 36 42 32 15 79 58 69 58
Negative figures indicateincrease (dccree) inholdings by financialintermediaries coincident with decrease(increase) in outstanding.
Between 1929 and 1949the share offinancial intermediariesin total United Statesgovernment securitiesoutstanding increased from 52 percent to 69 percent, or by 17 points.Most of this increase isaccounted for byintra-agency holdings;the Federal Reserve banks, thePostal SavingsSystem, andgovernmepen- sion and trustfunds togetherincreased theirshare in the fed-eral debt outstanding from 8 to 23 per cent. llie sbare of private
financial intermediaries rose only insignificantly from -14 to 47
per cent. Among them the only substantial increases were regis-
tered l)y life insurance companies, the holdings of which advanced
trom 2 to 6 per cent of total outstanding. Most of the other groups
held a smaller proportion of the federal debt in 1949 than in 1929.
Commercial banks in particular accounted for oniy 26 per cent of
Treasury securities in 1949 against 29 per cent in 1929.
There are three periods during which the federal government
has absorbed funds on a large scale, the two world wars and the
thirties. Financial intermediaries furnished about one-tb ird of
the funds during World War I, about two-thirds (luring World
War II, and practically 100 per cent during the thirties. They also,
as a rule, increased their holdings, or at least decreased them but
little, in periods when the total federal debt was stable or when
the Treasury supplied rather than absorbed funds. As a result the
holdings of United States government securities by financial in-
termediaries increased by $177 billion between 1900 and 1949,
or by almost 70 per cent of the total increase in the federaldebt.
Governmental organizations supplied 23 per cent; the commercial
banking system, 26 per cent; and other private financial inter-
niediaries, the remaining 20 per cent. Financial intermediaries
thus were the main source of supply of funds for the federal go-
ernment, not only for the period as a whole but also for all sig-
nificant subperiods with the exception of World War 1.
State arid local government securities
Financial intermediaries have held one-half or more of the
amount outstanding of state and local government, securities at
all benchmark dates. Their share declined until the early twenties;
showed only a minor upward movement from then on to the end
of the Great Depression; but increased during the thirties and
early forties to over three-quarters.
The aggregate share of financial intermediaries in state and
local government debt outstanding, as it is shown in Table 13, is
as high as 78 per cent in 1945 and 77 per centin 1949. These




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7local governinetit securities outstanding actually held by financial
intermediaries. The first reason is that the holdings of a few
groups, for which no detailed statistics are available, may have
been overstated. Secondly, state and local government Securities
may now be carried on the average at slightly above par in the
balance sheets of financial intermediaries whereas the statistics of
outstandings are all expressed in par values. Thirdly, the statistics
of holdings, as they are reported for the different types of financial
intermediaries, may include some categories of securities not in-
cluded in the statistics of state and local government debt, although
it is difficult to see how the amounts involved could be significant.
While these discrepancies may, and probably do, lead to a slight
overstatement of the holdings of state and local government se-
curities by financial intermediaries (Table 13) , and their ratio
to total state and local government debt (Appendix Table A-2),
they are not likely to be of considerable size and should not affect
the main trends shown by the figures.
Between 1900 and 1933 when the share of holdings of financial
intermediaries in state and local government securities outstand-
ing decreased from three-fifths to slightly over one-half, there
were two pronounced changes in the shares of individual groups
of financial intennediaries. The first is the increase of the hold-
ings of personal trust departments from 9 per cent of state and
local government securities outstaiiding in 1900 to 22 per cent
in 1933, most of the increase occurring between the 1912 and 1922
benchmarks. This movement is of interest because it reflects the
increasing share of state and local government securities within
personal trust departments (15 per cent in 1933 against 5 per cent
in 1900) and is clearly traceable to the introduction and increase
of the personal income tax which made the tax-exempt state and
local government securities particularly attractive to individuals
in high income brackets, who predominate among beneficiaries
of personal trust funds. The second important change is the sharp
decline in the share of state and local government securities held
by mutual savings banks - from 34 per cent in 1900 to 5 per cent
in 1933 - which accounts for more than the total shrinkage in
the share of all financial intermediaries. This decline is due to a
59I
reduction in the shareof state and local governmentSCCUFItIes
among assets of mutualsavings banks (9 per cent in 1929 against
20 per cent in1912 and 24 percent in 1900) and probably i
influenced by the increasingdifferential between the yieldoil
tax-exempt state and localgoverlilucilt bonds and those on tax-
able bonds andmortgages. Thus exactly the same featurethat made state and localgovernment securities more attractiveto per- sonal trust fundsafter the introductionof the personal income tax in 1913 renderedthem less desirableto the mutual savings
banks, whose incomeis not subjectto taxation.
Between 1933 and1949 the share of financialintermediaries in state and localgovernment debt increased from 56to 77 per cent. Mutual savingsbanks virtually liquidatedtheir holdings, while four othergroups increased their sharesmoderately by 1 to 3 per cent ofOutstandings: personaltrust departments,prop- erty insurancecompanies, governmenttrust funds, and govern- ment lending institutions.The decisive increasewas attributable to commercial banks,which lifted theirshare from 15 to 32per cent of outstandings,reflecting an increasein absolute holdings from2.6 billion in 1933to S4.O billion in 1945and S6.6 billion in 1949. ThisFSC paralleled the absolutegrowth of totalassets of commercialbanks between 1933and 1945, thoughstate and localgovernment securities in 1945accounted for a smallerpro- portion of totalassets than in 1933.Between 1945 and 1949, however,Comniercial banks' holdingsof state and localgovern- ment securities rosemore rapidly than totalassets (their share increased from 2to 1 per cent)or than the total debtof state and localgovernments. One of thereasons for the increasing importance ofcommercial banks' holdingsof state and localgov- errirnent securities, bothin relation totheir ownassets and to the total supplyof such securities,is the taxexemption feature of this kind ofsecurity. In a periodof risingcorporate tax rates this featurewas increasingly attractiveto commercial banks,whose profits are taxable,although not tomutual savings banksor life insurance companies, whoseearnings are, broadlyspeaking, not subject to corporateincome tax. Anotheris the closeconnection between commercialbanks and theirown localities andstates,
60which may have niade participation in the fiiiaming oh heavy
capital expenditures afterVorld \ar 11 appear in the nature of
accommodating a regular important customer.
Financial intermediaries throughout the period were the main
source of funds for state and local governments. Ofthe increase
in debt between 1900 and 1949 of approximatch' SI 9 hullioii,
which may he regarded as a rough measure of the net absorption
ol funds by state and local governments, financial intermediaries
furnished about $15 billion, or almost [our-fifths. Between 1900
and 1929 their share in supplying the financial needs of stateand
local governments was slightly above one-half. I)uring the last
twenty years, however, the absorption of stateand local govern-
ment securities by financial intermediaries ofabout .SS billion
has been considerably in excess oh the total increase in state and
local government debt of 56 billion. The holdings of gr0U)S
other than financial intermediaries, therefore, decreased from
about $7 billion in 1929 to about $5 billion in 1949.19 The financ-
ing of state and local governments thus has now beconiealmost
exclusively an institutional matter, and individuals participatein
it predominantly through personal trust fundsadministered by
banks and trust companies.
Corporate and foreign bonds
During the lastfifty years the supply of corporate bonds has
been increasingly concentrated in the portfoliosof financial in.
terinediaries.2° At the 1900 and 1912 benchmarks,financial inter-
mediaries held approximately one-third of all corporatebonds
The estimates of individuals' holdings, calculated asthe residual between total
outstanding and holdings of linandal intermediaries, agreereasonably well with
figures tlerised from estate tastatistics(see R.W. Goldsmith,A StudyofSaving
in the UnitedStates [Princeton University Press, 1954]. Vol.111, l'art lit).
in this section the description "corporate bonds"includes foreign bonds, both cor-
porate and government. iinlesotherwise indicated. Segregation of foreign bonds
among the holdings of financialintermediaries is generally unnecessary since foreign
bonds accounted for at most S per cent of corporateand foreign bonds (1922, 1945)
and at most benchmark dates represented less than 6 per centof the total. The
proportion of foreign to domestic corporate bonds outstanding wassomewhat higher






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)outstanding in the United States. In 1929 their share hadincreased
to nearly one-half. Ten years laterit had risen to approximately
two-thirds of outstanding. In 1949, finally, more thanfour-fifths
of all corporate bonds outstanding were in thehands of financial
intermediaries.A (Sc-c Tablc 14.)
The increase in the share of financial intermediariesin the
supply of corporate bonds is still more evident if we look atthe
relation between the increase in the holdings of corporatebonds
by financial intermediaries and the change of totaloutstandings
between benchmark dates. From1900 to 1929 the increase in
intermediaries' holdings of about $20 billion was equal tojust
about one-half of the growth in bonds outstanding, andthe pro-
portion was close to this ratio for all three interbenchmarkperiods
within these thirty years. From 1929 on, however,the holdings
of financial intermediaries have continuouslyincreased by more
than the total supply of corporate bonds, or theyhave decreased
less than the supply. Hence financialintermediaries have, in the
aggregate, supplied all new funds raisedby corporate borrowers
by issuance of bonds and have, in addition,taken over a consid-
erable part of the corporate bonds held in 1929 bynoninstitutional
investors. This is true not only for the twenty-yearperiod as a
whole but also for the four interbenchmarkperiods within it.
Indeed, life insurance companies alone haveincreased their bond
holdings by more than the rise in total supplyof corporate bonds.
The large-scale migration of corporatebonds into the port-
folios of financial intermediarieshas taken three routes. The
first, and the most obvious one,is direct placement of securities
with small groups of buyers1virtually identical with financial
intermediaries, a practice that has developedsince the thirties.22
lilt is possible that the amountsoutstanding used in the calculation are somewhat
too low and consequently theratios of financial intermediari& holdingssomewhat
overstated. The ratio may, on the other hand,be slightly understated because the
average book value of corporatebonds held by financial intermediaries islikely to
have been below par at most benchmarkdates. These errors, however, ii they arc
material at all, are not large enough to affectthe levels or trends discussed in this
section.
For the entire period from 1934 to 1919, 3-1 per centof the new issues of corporate
bonds have been placed directly, and theproportion has averaged 4S per cent for
(ConHnued on page 64)
6S\Vhcneve1 eithera new or a refunding issue is directly
placed!, tile increase in thebOnd portfolios of financialintermediai.ies is at leasts large as the increase in totalbonds outstanding.A Silnilat- testrit isobtajuedlW1ICIIa new issue ispItl)liCIyOffered the secondtome -- l)Llt fulancia Iibltcltncdjarjs puichasealmost the Cfltireissue either imniecliatelyupon ISSIIaIICC or short ly aftet. waid, as has beenCOlIifl1011 Silice the thirti. lhie thirdroute by whuch the shareof financial intermediariesiii corporatebonds Outstandjmo has heel)increased is theOCflmarket 1)UIctIaseof olltstandjno issues fromflonjnstjEulional holders. AIthiotiohi110 (Jetajie(I stdjes havebeen made, it is probablethat this route has accounted for a considerablysmaller proportion ofthe increase in the shareof financialintermediaries than eitherof the two others, particuiai-lysince tile thirties. Before thattime, when direct placementswere almost unknown, boththe purchaseof new public offeringsand open marketpurchases of outstanding i&sue5 wet-c ofconsiderable importancealthough it is impossible to assess their relativesignificance.
In additionto the sharj) increasein the share offinancial inter- lilediaries' holdingsin totaloutstanding, considerablechanges llae Occurred inthe distributionof financialintermediaries' total holdings ofcorporate bonds as betweenthe maingroups of in- termediaries Thicechanges arc theresult of differencesin the rate of growth oftotal assets andof changes in theproportion of total assetsinvested incorporate bonds. Ingeneral tile first factor has been themore iIl)J)Ortant one.
In 1900,commercial banks, lifeinsurance companies andper- sonal trust departmentseach held bctween8 and 10per cent of total corporatebonds ourstanditig,and mutualsavings banks were not far behind with6 per cent. By1929 the sharesfor the three largestholders wereup to 11 to 15per cent, but theirrela- tion was stillnot too different fromthat prevailingthree decades



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































earlier. Sharplydivergent trends, however,appeared with the Great Deprc&siwiAs a result, life insurancecompanies in 1949 accounted for more than50 per cent of totalOutstanding, while COfllnlercial banks andpersonal trust departmentsfell backto their share of fiftyyears earlier, Together, however,these three groups still accountedfor about four-fifthsof total Institutional holdings, slightlymore than in 1900. Thiscontinued predonij Dance was possiblebecause over halfa century only oneimportant new holder ofcorporate bonds hademergedprivate pension fundsand even theyaccounted for only 6per cent of totalout- standing in 1949.
No comparabledata are availablefor the bonds bymain groups of issuers sincetheappropriate breakdown isunavailable forsev- eral groups offinancial intermediaries,particularly personaltrust departmenIt is, however,possible to followthe share of the holdings ofmost groups of financialintermediaries in theamount outstanding of the threemain groups ofdomesticcorporate and of foreign bonds.These figuresshould not beseriously inerror since the financialintermediaries forwhich theyare available account for abouttwo-thirds of the holdingsof all financialinter- niediaries in 1900and 1929 andto as muchas four-fifths in 1949. Table 15, which,flotwitllstandinga considerablemargin of error in some ofthe figures,may he regardedas reflecting the main trends, peru-mi ts thefollowing conclusiomis;
There wasa definitely upwardtrend in the shareof financial intermediaries' holdingsin all threemaingroups of domestic issues ofcorporate bonds (railroads,public utilities,and others) and in foreignbonds.
Of the threemaingroups of corporatebonds this trendis leastpronounced in thecase of railroad bonds.Here the shareof financial intermediarieshas less thandoubled between1900 and 1949, and therise has virtuallycome to a halt sincethe Great I)epressjon23 Evenso, financialintermfledial-jes Sincethe twenties have heldat least two-fifthsof railroadbondsOutstanding. The mostregular increase inthe share offinancial inter-
"If allowance iamade for the holdingsof personaltrust departmenthe share has probably declinedbetween 1929 and 1949.
66
4mediaries' holdings occurred in public utility bonds. In 1900
probably less than one-fifth of all public utility bonds outstanding
were held by financial intermediaries. Fifty yearslater the posi-
tions were almost reversed and not much more titan one-fourth
of all public utility bends were to be found outside the portfolios
of financial intermediaries.21
The share of financial intermediaries in other domestic cor-
porate (i.e. largely industrial) bonds was relatively low andfailed
to show a definite rise up to the Great Depression.For the twenties
this may be clue to the fact that financial intermediaries pur-
chased virtually none of the large amounts of real estatebonds
issued during the decade.21 Since the mid-thirties, however, the
increase in the share of financial intermediaries has been more
rapid in this category than for any other type of bond. As a result
over four-fifths of all industrial and miscellaneous corporatebonds
were held by financial intermediaries in 1949,while their share
had been less than one-third a bare ten years earlier.
Up to the early thirties, financial intermediariesheld gen-
erally about one-fourth of all foreign bonds in the UnitedStates.26
The considerable increase in the last fifteen years,which raised
the share to over two-thirds in 1949, is exclusivelythe result of the
acquisition of Canadian bonds.27 it is probable, though compre-
hensive figures seem to be missing, that the majorityof Canadian
bonds held in the United States are now foundin the portfolios
of financial intermediaries but thatfinancial intermediaries hold
"These figures make rough allowances for the bondholdings of personal Ernst
departments.
'The sharp decline in the ratio between 1929 and1933 shown in Table 15 is sonic-
what puuling, even if itis somewhat exaggerated by the fact that the estimatesof
bonds outstanding reflect par values while the bookvalues of financial inter-
mediaries' holdings of that year were affected byconsiderable svritcdowns. Possibly
the relatively poor default record of industrialbonds (Hickman. op. cit., Table
A-17) led to large net sales.
Before 1922 the absolute amounts of outstandings aswell as of intermediaries'
holdings ale very small.
Canadian government bonds held by the forty-ninelargest life imisumance com-
panies alone (see J. J. O'Leary, 1951 Record of LifeInsurance Iniestments [Life
Insurance Association of America, 1951], p. 16)increased from 5 per cent in 1929
to 49 per cent in 1919 of the value of foreignbonds held in the United States. (See
Appendix Table A-2).
67S
only a small fraction-- as they have done throughout theperiod of the bonch ofnon-Canadian foreign issuers soldin the United States.
Corporate stock
Financial intermediarieshave been of lessimportance as fund Suppliers in thecase of corporate stock thanfor almostany type of bondor loan. Moreover,most of the holdings of financialinter- mediaries in this fieldare accounted for bypersonal trust depart- rnents.
At the turn ofthe century financialintermediaries heldabout one-twelfth of allcorporate stock outstanding.28This proportion increased slowlyto between one-eighthand one-seventh inthe twenties. It rose sharplyto fully one-fifth between1929 and 1933 and has remainedat approximately thatlevel until 1949.The increase in the shareduring the GreatDepression is partlydue to a relatively highproportion of wellseasoned and lessspeculative stocks in theportfolios ofpersonal trust departments.Finally, the fact that thebook value ofstock holdings hadto be used for some groups, thoughnot the most importantones, may have led to someunderstatement of theshare of financialintermediaries in total stockoutstanding in 1929and someoverstatement in 1933 and, hence,possibly to asubstantial exaggerationof the in- crease in that shareduring the GreatDepression. The level ofthe share offinancialintermediaries' holdingsis considerably higher forpreferred than forcommon stock. Precise figures areimpossible toobtain because thebreakdown of the holdingsadministered bypersonal trust departmenmust remain largely conjectural.It is probable,however, that in1949 the share of financialintermediarieswas between 20and 25 percent for common stock but around40 per cent forpreferred stock. The share ofintermediaries' holdingsin marketablestocks is somewhat higher thanTable 16 indicatesSince financialinstitu-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3tions held only smallquantities of nonmarketableissues-mostly to be found in trust departmentswhile a substantialproportion of all stock outstandingis of this type, in 1949possibly as inu as one-fifth of the total. Tueshare of financialintermediaries in marketable stock outstanding,therefore, may have beenas high as 30 per cent in 1949 (comparedwith 24 per cent inTable 16) of which 20per cent was accounted for bypersonal trust depart
mnents and 10 per cent by allother intermediaries.
Personal trust departmentswere by far the mostimportant group of holders atevery benchmark date,accounting for betweej three-fifths andseven-eighths of the total forall financialinter- mediaries. In 1900personal trust departmentsheld 5 percent of all domesticstock outstanding. In1929 their share badrisen to 8 per cent, wellbelow the 1922peak of ii percent. From 1933to 1949 it variedbetween 13 and 16per cent. Two factors havecon- tributed to thisincrease. The first isthe increasingproportion of the assetsadministered by personaltrust departmentsinvested in stocks. The secondis the more rapidgrowth of personaltrust fund assets thanof the value of totalstock outstanding.Both forces operated until the earlytwenties. Since thenthe increase inthe share ofoutstanding stock held inpersonal trust departmentsis due exclusivelyto the rise in theproportion of such fundsin- vested in stocks,a rise reflecting definitechanges in the invest- znent policy of thetrustees, somew1at delayedby the slownessof changes in statutoryprovisions and in thespecificatjois of trust instruments
Holdings of all othergroups of financialintermediaries have been smallthroughout the periodcompared to the totalvalue of stocks outstanding,none having beensubstantially inexcess of 2 per cent forany benchmark date.The share ofmanagement in- vestment companies haskept between li/2and 2 percent since these companies beganlarge-scale operationsin the latetwenties. Even the inclusionofinvestmnentholdingcompanies does not raise the share ofinvestmentcompanies to more than4 per cent. In this case thetrend iS determinedlargely by thetotal assets of invcstn)eflt companiessince most of theirfunds are alwayskept in stocks. Theshare ofproperty insurancecompanies in total stock
70outstanding has increased fairly steadily since 1929, but even in
1949 it was not much in excess of 2 per cent. Still smaller arc the
shares of life insurance companies and private pension plans, al-
though their growth has been more rapid during the last decade.
The picture is somewhat different it prelerred stocks are studied
separately. Here financial intermediaries other than personal trust
departments accounted for over 10 per cent of ouLstancling in
1933 but by 1949 had increased their share to 20 per cent. Next
to personal trust departments, life insurance companies have be-
come the most important group of financial intermediaries hold-
ing preferred stock. From a negligible proportion up to the late
twenties their share in outstanding of preferred stock sharply
increased in the forties, reaching 10 per cent in 1949. The pro-
portion is about 5 per cent for property insurance companies
against 2 per cent in 1929. Private pension funds seem to account
for another 3 per cent in 1949, but this figure is a precarious
estimate.
The share of fInancial intermediaries in the total flow of equity
funds to corporations cannot be immediately derived from these
figures since they are greatly affected by stock price changes.25
It is clear, however, even from the figures of changes in values of
holdings between benchmark dates, that financial intermediaries
have constituted only a secondary source of equity funds and one
almost negligible if the holdings of personal trust departments -
which often represent not net purchases but gifts or inheritances
- are eliminated.
The situation is different for preferred stock, for which the
changes in holdings can be used with less reservation as indicative
of the flow of funds involved. Of the increase in preferred stock
outstanding of about $12 billion between 1900 and 1949, less
than $3 billion is accounted for by increases in holdings of finan-
cial intermediaries, although personal trust departments add an-
For a reasonably close estimate it is necessary to use figures for net issue(i.e. cash
proceeds of issues less cash outlays for retirements) of stock on the one hand, and
net purchases or sales of stock by financial intermediaries on the other. Such figures
have beers prepared for the period from 1897 to 1919 as part of R. W. Goldsmith,
A Study of Savingu the United States(Princeton University Press. 19l). (See
fables V-35 to V-78 in Vol. I and discussion in Vol. II, Chap. VIII, Sec. 3.)
71other2 billion. Theaggregate figures, however,mean little as the relationsare entirely different before and afterthe Great De-
pression Between 1900and 1929, preferred stockoutstanding also increased by about $12 billionwhile the holdings offinancual in- termediai-ies (exchirlingpersonal trust dcparmcuits)rose by less than $1 billion.Even allowing forshortcomings of theestimates, it is clear thatthe share of financialincermc-diaries in providing funds tocorporations in the form ofpreferred stockwas quite minor. Since 1933,however the holdings ofpreferred stocks by financial intermediarieseven excluding personaltrust depart- ments, have risen bymore than the total increasein preferred stock outstanding.Hence financialintermediaries wouldseem to have provided,in theagg-regate, all the funds raised bycorpora- tions through themeans of preferred stock duringthe last two dccades.o
Itis not possibleto determine the shareof financial inter- mcdiai-jes in theoutstanding amounts ofcommon and preferred stock of themaui industriescornprehensiel} or reliably.Data are availal)le at leastfor part of theperiod, for investmentand insurance companies,but theyare missing for the largestholder, personal trust departmentsThe availabledata do notpoint to substantial differencesbetween thedistribution by industryof the stock holdingsof financialintermediariesamong major in- dustries and oftotal stockoutstanding. Among themain indus- tries theproportion ofCommon or Preferred stockheld by financial intermediaries probablydoes not differmuch. It is likely,how- ever, that, at leastat recent benchmarkdates, theproportion of financial intermediaries'holdings was relativelylow for railroad and financialstocks and relativelyhigh for publicutility stocks.
Mortgage loans
Mortgages througluotitthe period havebeen heldPredominantly by financialintermediaries butthe share oftheir holdin5 has iuicreased from iìo muchover one-half in 1900to almost three-
ThiS surmise isconfirmed by themore appropriate figureson net issues and net puiciases by financialfltCrnSedj;urjes of plefcrle(IStock. (ibid., TalJV-9 and V-5L)
72fourths in 1949. The increase has occurred mainly in three periods.
The first and sharpest increase took place between the bench-
marks of 1900 and 1912, raising the share of mortgages held by
financial intermediaries from approximately 55 to over 65 per
ccitt of the total outstanding.The second increase occurred
during the twenties and lifted the share of financial intermedi-
aries in total mortgages outstanding from slightly above 60 per
cent in 1922 to almost 70 per cent in 1929. The thirdrise in the
late thirties increased the share further from 64 per centin 1933
to 70 per cent in 1939, a levelwhich was restored by 1949 after
a clip to 68 per cent at timeend of World War 11. Although the
comprehensive figures used in this report are notcontinued
beyond 1949, it is very likely that the share of financialinter-
inediaries in total mortgages outstanding continued to increasein
the next three years and reached a new high. (SeeTable 17.)
A more dramatic picture of time share of financialintermediaries
in mortgage loans is provided by changes betweenbenchmark
dates in the proportion of the total increase (ordecrease) in total
mortgage loans outstanding accounted forby Financial intermedi-
aries. For the period as a whole, total mortgagedebt increased by
$59 billion while the mortgageholdings of financial intermediaries
rose by $44 billion.Financial intermediaries thus supplied about
three-fourths of the total funds used for mortgageloans.32 In
none of the sevenperiods did financial intermediariesabsorb
much less than 60 per cent of the totalincrease in mortgages
outstanding, and in several of them theyaccounted for as much
as 75 per cent. Itt oneperiod (1934-1939) the holdings offiuman-
cial intermediaries increasedwhile mortgages outstanding de-
creased.
There is little doubt about the directionof the movement, but the extent depends
somewhat on the estimates of total mortgagesoutstanding which for these two
benchmark dates are subject to a considerablemargin of error. (Ibid., Vol. II, Chap.
IX, Sec. 6.)
'This calculation disregards some adjustments[or non-cash items which should
be made in the changes of both total mortgagesoutstanding and mortgages held
by financial intermediaries, and probably morein the fonner than the latter. These
adjustments would not affect the ratio to asignificant extent, although they might




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2In addition to the basic trend toward an increase infinancial
interniecliaries' share in tota' mortgages outstanding, pr'mounccd
shifts occurred in the hol(lings of the different groups ol financial
iiiieiuiediaues. In 1900 more mortgagcs were administered by
personal trust departments than were held by any other single
group of financial intermcdiarics - aboutone-third of all mort-
gages in the hands of financial intermediaries andnearly one-fifth
of all mortgages outstanding. As a result of an almost continuous
decline, particularly pronounced before 1929, the share of trust
departments fell by 1949 to 2 per cent of total holdings by finan-
cial intermediaries and to 1½ pei' cent of all mortgages outstand-
ing. This was the effect, first, of the slower growth of the assets
administered by personal trust departments since 1929 than of
all financial intermediaries and, second and more important,of
the decline of the percentage of the total assets of all personal
trust funds invested in mortgages from about 40cent in 1900
to only 2 per cent in 1949.
Most of the other groups of financial intermediaries havegained
in importance as mortgagees. The main exception is presented by
mutual savings banks whose share in mortgagesoutstanding has
declined, slowly and irregularly, from a peak of about15 per cent
in 1912 to about 10 per cent in l949.This was due primarily to
the relatively slow growth of the assets ofmutual savings banks
and only since the early forties to adecline in the share o the
assets which they invested in mortgages.
The increase in the proportion of total mortgagesoutstanding
held by financial intermediaries has beenaccounted for primarily
by three groups - savings and loan associations,commercial banks,
and life insurance companies. The share ofeach of these institu-
tions increased from 6 to 8 per cent in 1900 to18 to 20 per cent
in 1949. Together they accountedfor only one-third of all mort-
gages held by financialintermediaries in 1900, but for three-
fourths of institutional mortgage holdingsin 1949. Their share in
n The share of fire and marine insurance companies and mortgagecompanies in
total mortgages outstanding also declined,but their holdings were relatively small
at all benchmark dates.
75total mortgages outstanding rose from only one-fifth at theturn
of the century to over one-half fifty years latci-.
The share of savings and loan associations inmortgages ou_
standing inurcase(1 steadily, with an in teiruption onlyhctwe(i
1929 and I 93ft from 6 pccitt iiiI 900 to 18 per cent ii1949.
This was due exclusively to the idat ively rapid growthof their
total assets since mortgages have always in-counted fur nearlytlieji
entire mvcsunents.
The increase in the share of life inSurance companiesfrom 7
to 20 per cent was concentrated in the periods from 1900to 1912
and 1922 to 1929, but was also considerable in the1940's. Itwas
largely due to the relatively rapid increase in totalassets of these
companies since mortgages accounted for nearly 30per Cent of
their total assets at the beginning but only for slightlyover 20
per cent at the end of the period.
Most of the increase in the share of commerciall)anks fi-m 8
to 18 per cent occurred before 1912. After a slightdecline Over
the next three (lecacics, a second increase after\Vorlcl War II
lifted their share in mortgages outstanding from13 per cent in
1945 to 18 per cent four years later. This sharp andconcentrated
advance reflected largely an increase in the shareof mortgages
among bank assets.
Quite different changes are shown in the sharesof land banks
and government lending institutions. The land banks,created in
the second decade of the century, and limitedto farm mortgages,
slowly increased their share in totalmortgages outstanding toa
peak of 6 per cent in 1939. The liquidation ofmost of these banks
in the last decade has decreased the shareof the group tonot
much over 1 per cent in 1949. Governmentlending institutions,
which began their Operations only in theGreat Depression,ac-
counted by 1939 for 8 per cent of totalmortgages outstanding,
largely the result of the Home OwnersLoan Corporation's and
the Federal National MortgageCorporation's acquisition of dis-
tressed mortgage loans from financialintermediaries and other
mortgagces. As these mortgages were paid offor sold to other
mortgagees, the share of government lendinginstitutions (lCCliflCd.
76By 1919 ii had fallen to 3 cent, represented largely byhold-
ings of the Federal National MortgageCorporation.
The proportion of the main types of mortgagesheld by Ilnancial
intermediaries has differed consldcral)ly,particularly as I)ct\vecmi
farm and nonfarm mortgages.34 In recent yearslinancial inici -
mediaries have held between two-thirds andthrec-fouIths of laini
as well as nonfaitii mortgages.In the case of nonfaini mortgages.
however, the share of financial intermediarieshas been close to
two-thircls at all benchmark years during the lasthalf century.
Of farm mortgages, on time otherhand, slightly over one-third
was held by financialintermediaries at the turn of the century;
about one-half by 1912; and more thanthree-fifths only since the
late twenties and then only withthe help of land banks and other
government lending institutions.Financial lntermlle(liaries thus
have been a much more important sourceof supply of nonfarin
than of farm mortgage money.
The available basic data are riotcomprehensive or reliable
enough to permit further breakdownsfor types of nonfann inort-
gages. The material,however, does not point tosubstantial clii-
ferences in the share of financialintermediaries, at least not as
between residential andnonresidential mortgages or as between
one-to-four family homes and multifamilydwellings.
Short-term (non-mortgage)loans
Short-term loans are ofimportance for oniy a few groupsof
financial intermediaries -particularly commercial banks and gov-
ernment lending agencies -but for these they represent oneof
the major assets.35 Even forall financial intermediaries taken to-
Since the already rough estimates oftotal mortgage holdings of personal trust
departments had to be allocated betweenfarmand isonfarm mortgages inproportion
to outstandings except forthe last decade, this paragraph isbased on only very
rough figures.
No classification ot loans bymaturity is entirely satisfactory in concept orcon-
sistently applicable to the availabledata. The difficulties are indicated,though not
exhausted, by the difference betweencontractual and actual duration; the difference
between original duration anddistance to maturity at the date ofcreditors' or
debtors' balance sheet; and the manytransitory stages existing between claims
designated as securities (particularly thosewith a short remaining life), mortgages,
(Continued Ofl page 78)
77gether such loans haveaccounted for a substantial thoughdccl in_ ing proportionof total assets more thanone-fourth in 1900,
fully one-fifth in1929, but only approximatelyone-tenth in 1949, 'The main di(ficultin determining the share offinancial intei- tncdjarjes in total short-term(non-mortgage) credit is theabsence of (:ornprchcnsjsrefigures on the total debtof this typein the economy. Next to financialinstitutions, themost importantsup- pliers of short-termcredit are nonfi,iancjalbusiness enterprisesin Corporate or unincorporatedform, but few reliableor comprejlcn sive dataare available on either theaggregate or the distribution of the short-termcredits extended by them.36Virtually nothing is known of theshort-tei-in credit transactionsamong individuals. It is, therefore,impossible to attempt forthese loansa statistical comparison of the type thathas been presented forsecurities and mortgage loans. The availabledata are barelysufficient to estab- lish the levelof the share of financialintermediaries in allshort- term (non-mortgage)loans or to besure about the trendsover the last fiftyyeats.
Between 1900 and1929 total short-term(non-mortgage) loans of the financialintermediaries covered bythe basic tabulations increased from $5to $35 billion, Inclusionof the receivablesof finance companiesand of securitybrokers and dealerswould not affect the estimatefor 1900 greatly butwould raise that for1929 to as muchas $45 billion. The increaseby 600 to 800per cent in three decadesappears definitely inexcess of the growth oftotal
ecu1ed and unsectiredcredits, With the availablestatistirs probably all thatcan be done is toput together all the"receivables" listed in thebalance sheets of financial intermediariesexcept those classifiedas securities or asmortgage loans. There is little doubtthat most of theclaims falling into thiscategory represent short-term credits in thesense that their actuallife does not exceed,say, three years. It is equally celtain,however, that a notnegligible fraction of thetotal is not of this characterand, what is moreserious for an analysisof tIme figures. that the division betweentrue short-term creditsand other non-mortgageloans differs among financial intermediariesand has changedover time. In the absenceof corn- prehensi'c and systematicstudies in thi5 field ithas not beenpossible to refine the data as they are foundin the balance sheetsof the variousgroups of financial intermediaries and toproceed beyond anadmittedly rather broadcategory of 'non-mortgage loans."





11904.1932:R. R. Doane, TheMeasurementofAmerican Wealth (Harper&
Bros., 1933), p. 199;includes notes receivable.
21929. 1933:Statisticsof income.(All nonfinancialcorporation5excludes
financial corporations nottreated as financialintermediaries.)
1939:StatisticSofincome. (All corporationsexcluding banks and trust
companies.)
1945:Securities and ExchangeCommission, StatisticalBulletin, August
1, 1950.
1949:ibid., May 1, 1952.
3R. W. Goldsmith,A Study of Saving inthe United States (PrincetonUniver
sity Press, 1954),Tables U-I to U-9.
4,5Table 7, lines 6 to 8and 8. respectively.
short-tern!(nonmOrtgage) debt in theeconomy. It is,therefore,
likely that duringthis period the shareof financialintermediaries
in total short-termdebt increased,and possibly to asubstantial
extent, but thatmost of theincrease occurredbefore 1922. (See
Table 18.)
Total short-termloans of financialintermediaries (including
finance companiesand securitybrokers and dealers)were only
slightly higher in1949 than theyhad been twenty yearsearlier.
Since the totalof such debtoutstanding was almostcertainly con-
siderably higher in1949 than in 1929,the share offinancial inter-
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1929 79.3 $22.7 $6.2 34.8
12.6
1933 41.8' 14.6 22.6
12.0






Share of FinancialIntermediaries in Short-Term(Non.Mortga) l.uans
(billions of dollars)
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARWSmediat ics SeetUsto have declined, thoiti11 itprobably waswell above tile level of theturn of the century.37
Estimates of the absolutevalues of the share, ratherthan of its IIIOVCII]CIHS al-c cvc-nmore hazardous. All thatcati be said is that financialiii teriilc(hjari(s'shai-c short-tciii1(lIOiinIortage) CFC(ljt (10(5 hOtSeemto have exceededone-half at any timeand is probably sutiievhat, though notvery mitch, below thatlevel at mid-cent11 ry.
Even foran clemnentar).' tin(Icis(alcliIiffof the i-ole offInancial iUteiiflC(ljarjes in thesupply of1mu-mflortggci'cd it, it isneces- sary to distinguishthree types ofsuch cicdits: loanson COlisI1eI- credit, andhitisjnloans. Virtuallyallloans onse- curities al-c madeby finaiicjalinterincdjarjesI)rinlarilyconimer. cial banks, eitherdirectly or indirectlyithe formof bank loans to bi-okei-s whore-loan theproceeds to theirCIISIOWCI'S 'Fhie only CXCC1)tjOfl OCctLt'rc(J inthe latetwetis whieii nonfIilall(jalcor- porations machesubstatitialamounts of fuflds availablefor Stock Fxchian2c loansand for a shortperjod Suppliedmore than one- third of totalreported loanson securities.ss
Financialintermediaries havebeen equallyPredomiiiati as stlpj)liers ofcolistItlier credit. Theavailable data, however,are not sufficiently reliable,Comprehensive, orconSistCIt topermit more than two bi-oadconclusionsFirst, the shareof financialmEet-- inecliarics in totalconsumer creditOutstandingincreased consid- ci ably between1900 and 1929bitt hasnot shown a clefiutitetrend (luring the lasttwo decades Second,since 1929,financial intel- mnediaries havesul)plicd approximatelytwo-thirds of allorgan- izedConslitner cl-edit (includingpolicy Joans) The share offinancialinterrncdIjarjes inshort-t-loans to business (excIrtchjiiloans onsecurities) can bedetei-iiijmjcci oni)- very Joiighly. Thescattered data,some of whichare P1-CSented in Table 18,permit only twotentaliv('ouch USIOnS.The hi-st i-s that
'TIt is possiI)lctItathe chare of 1919will tuill (liltto he clOc toa low poiinit
long-brosI1IO\C1I]COES From 1919to 1952 aleast short-tern1loans of financial ilstcmsediarjSCCIII to mace ilIcrcase(l
SollicIc-liat 1110ccrapidly luau (howof oIlier lenders, Particularly
accounts lcCeivaI)k off101uhii1;Illjj1 bliiitcsst'nhc-rpu ices. Sec R. W. (.olt6injtljop. cit., \'ol. II, (:lia1,Xl aII(I 1fijl)-.
80the share of financial intermediaries in short-termbusiness loans
declined markedly between 1929 and 1939 butrecovered part of
the loss in the following ten years. Thesecond puts the share of
financial intermediaries in short-term business loans aswell under
one-half hn all l,eiiclimaik datcs.
Tue decline in the proportion of short-ternibusiness loans
supplied by financial intermediaries - primarilycommercial banks
-- duringthe last twenty years is compatible with the fragmentary
evidence on the relation between notes payable tobanks and
accounts payable to other creditors fordifferent branches of busi-
ness. So is the indicationthat the share of financial intermediaries
as suppliers of short-termbusiness credit declined between 1929
and 1939 but recovered from 1939 to1949. It is to be expected
that during a period of fallingprices and depressed business the
short-term loans of banks should bereduced more rapidly than
trade credit, and the opposite relation maybe expected to prevail
in periods of rising prices andexpanding business.
The absence of comprehensive orreliable data for most of the
period, and particularly before 1929, onthe share of financial
intermediaries in short-term businessloans is regrettable. The
only trustworthy long-term series,unfortunately limited to large
manufacturing and trade corporationsindicates a somewhat larger
increase of notes payablethan of accounts payable between1900
and l920,° i.e.it points to an increase inthe ratio o bank to
trade credit. During thetwenties, however, the ratio of bank
credit to trade credit declined -and eveti quite sharply - the di-
rection of the movementbeing in line with the furtherdecline
in the ratio observed inthe last two decades.Manipulation of a
set of over-allrough estimates also indicates asubstantial increase
in the ratio of bankcredit to trade credit duringthe first two
decades of the twentieth centuryand an equally sharp decline
'STable 18 points to a ratio of1:2 between short-termloans to business by banks
and trade credit for 1959. Anextensive sample study, based on 6,200nonfinancial
concerns, p0t5 the same ratio at1:2.5(N. H. Jacob) and R. J. Saulnier,Business
Finance and Banking [NationalBureau of Economic Research, 1947], p.41).
4'Jacoby and Saulnier, op. cit., p.88.
81during the twenties.4' Some ifl(lirCCt light, finally,may be sited on
the question by the ratio of the short-term businessloans of finan-
cial intermediaries togross national P1011t1ct S1I1CCit may be
assumed that the latter is a ieasonahly good indicatorof volume
of sales. This ratio increased between 1900 and1922, (leclined
moderately to 1929, experienceda comisiderahie further recluctioii
through 1945 but had partially recovered by1919.42To the extent
that changes in the ratio ofgross national l)I0(1(lCt to sales and of
sales to trade creditcan be regarded as absent or minor, these
movements confirm the ups and downs in the ratioof hank to
trade credit shown by the otherscattered data. It therefore looks
as if the share of financial intermediaries in thesupply of short-
term business credit had shownan increasing trend from tile turn
of the century to the earlytwenties but a declining trendover the
last thirty years.
Tangible assets
Tangible assets held by financialintermediaries are of three
types: buildings and equipmentfor own use, incomeproperties,
and foreclosed realestate. It is therefore difficult to decidewith which national totalto compare tangible asset holdingsof finan- cial intermediariesThere is also the difficulty thatfor the tangible
assets of financial intermediarieswe must rely on book values,
while national totalsare generally given incurrent values. For-
tunately, the problemsmay be dismissed summarilyas it is evident that the tangibleassets held by financial intermediariesrepresent
' Thisstatement is based on a comparisonof the short-tern-, business loansof financial intermediariesas shown in Table 18, with the differencebetween Doane's estiniates of all notes andaccounts receivable (R. It. Doanc, TkMeasure,,ienjof American JI'ealt/i[HarperBros.. 19331,p. 199) and of all short-termImimsines, loans offinancial intermediaries.Such a comparison, ofcourse,isvery hazardous, not only because of theuseofa residual betweentwofigures of doubtful comparability, hii, a iso F)CCZI USC Of thIecli aracter of I)oa nc'sestimates, the sources aislmuetliomis of derivation of which arenot known in detaiL
"The ratio continuedto rise between 1919 and 1952reflecting the sharp increase in bank loans to business whichhad been at an uliusuallyiow level during and ins- mediately after World War ILEven in 1952, however,the ratio of short-term loans to business by financialinrennediarjes to gross nationalproduct was still far below the level of the 1920's.
82only a very small proportion of thenational total, however defiiiccl
or measured.
Most of the holdings of tangil)le assetsby financial intermedi-
aries are concentrated among three groupscommercial banks,
life insurance companies, and personal trustdepartments.15
The broadest comparison andprobably one most appropriate
for most purposes, is that betweenall tangible assets held by Itnan-
cial intermediaries and the valueof structures, cquipmentali(l
inventories. Using original cost valuesfor the national totalt4 and
TABLE1 9
Share of Financial Internvsdiaries inTotal Tangibte Assets
Column
1,2From R. W. Goldsmith, AStudy of Saving in1/icUnitedta/es(I'rinCctOhI
University Press), Vol. 111; originalcost basis.
From Table 7.
4,5Column 3 divided by columns1 and 2 respectiVely.
' It may be recalled that thetangible assets of governmentlending instltfltiOflS are
not included in the tabulations onwhich these statistics are based.They amounted
in 1949 to 2 per cent of thenational total on a book valuebasis and at that (late
consisted mostly of inventories ofagricultural commodities held by theConiniodity
Credit Corporation.
"See R. %V. Goldsmith, 'APerpetual Inventory of NationalWealth," Studies in








NATIONAL TANGIBLE ASSETS INTER- langhble
Total Structures SIEDIARIES Assets Structures
(billions ofdollars) (per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1900 $53.8 $33.2 .9 1.7 2.7
2.9
1912 96.9 56.0 1.6 1.7
1922 183.3 88.7 2.9 1.6 3.3
2.9
1929 285.5 153.9 4.5 1.6
3.9
1933 260.7 157.9 6.1 2.3
4.6
1939 279.5 162.5 7.4 2.6
2.1
1945 326.6 169.9 3.6 1.1
1.6
1949 518.8 230.5 3.7 .70
1)00k values for the tangibleassets of financial intcrnlcdiaries,45
we find that the share of the latter amountedto 2 DCL' Cent up to
1929, rose steadily to 3per cent in 1939 as the result of fore-
Closures on real estate loans duringthe Great I)eprcssion,aiid declined toIper cent in 1919 as foreclosed propertieswere
liquidated. (Sec 1 able 19.)
The holdings of commercial bankshave consisted almostex-
clusively, except in the thirties,of the buildings in whichthey
have their offices. Thoseof life insurance companies havebegun to include increasingamounts of income properties, Imiltifamily
dwelliiigs as wellas office and factory buildings. The realestate in peisonal trust funds,finally, has consisted mainly ofincome
properties - residential, in-bannonresidential, and agricultural.
As would be expected fromthe nature of their operations,finaji-
cia! intermediaries havenever directly owned more thana neg-
ligible proportion otthe tangible wealth of thecountry. liven in the more restrictedfield of urban iionresjclentjalreal estate, in which their tangibleassets have been concentratedexcept (hiring
the thirties, theproportion of direct ownershipprobably has not
exceeded !i per centsave during the Great Depression.
Liabjjtjes
The share of financialintermediaries in total liabilitiesin the
United States has increasedconsiderably and almostcontinuously since the turn of thecentury.4° In 1900 slightlyunder one-quarter of all claimswere against financial intermediaries.Fifty years later
the proportion hadrisen to almost two-fifths.The rise was rather slow, though steady,between the benchmarksof 1900 and 1933 but very rapid between1933 and 1939. Duringthe last tenyears the ratio has remainedvirtually unchanged.
See Table 7, above, line 9.
e In all thesecalcuJatjos, claims againstgoverlIrlIelIt insurance aiid privatepension funds have beenregarded as part of liabilitiesof financial intermeljariesand measured by the totalassets of these funds even thoughthe ultimate beneficiaries may not base claims in the legalsense against the funds. Personaltrust depai tnients, however, have not beenregarded as giving riseto Creditor-debtor relationships between beneficiaries andtrustees.
84TABLE 20
Share of Financial Intermediaries inTotal Uabilities
Column
ISum of currency, bonds, mortgages,and short-term debt otttStafl(liflg(iticlUd-
big taaccruals); deposit liabilities of banksand rcscive liabilities of insurance
companies; government insurance andprivate pension funds. (From P..\V.
Goldsmith, A Study of Saving inthe United StatesfPrinceton University PressI,
\ol. IlL)
2Total assets of financial intermediariesminus equity of personal trustfunds
(Table 1) and of other intermediaries(Table 21).
S Column 2 divided by column 1.
These conclusions canbe drawn with areasonable degTee of
confidence from Table20, even though theabsolute level of the
ratio of financialintermediaries' liabilities tototal debt is subject
to considerable error,particularly because of thedifficulty of
making comprehensiveand rcliable estimatesof all debts in the
economy. Refinementof the estimateswould undoubtedly some-
what alter the ratios,though it might not affectthe trend; but
in any case it is notlikely to lead to amodification of the signifi-
cant result thatfinancial intermediaries now oweabout two-fifths
of the debt outstandingwithin the economy orthat their share in
total debt is considerablyhigher than it was fifty years ago.The
policies of financialintermediaries are, therefore, nowof much
greater importancefor the entire claimand credit structure ofthe
country than they werehalf a century earlier.
The increase in theshare of financialintermediaries as debtors






(billions of dollars) (per ceni)
(1) (2) (3)
1900 $50 $12 24
1912 95 26 27
1922 225 62 28
1929 325 94 29
1933 285 84 29
1939 360 135 38
1945 775 292 38
1949 875 325 37economy over the last fiftyyears. At the turn of theCentury non financial businesswas the most important debtor,aloneaccount ing for almostone-half of total debtoutstanding in theUnited States. Fjnaiicjalintermediaries came next withaboutone-fourth of the total.Individuals owed about one-fifthof the totaldebt, mostly in the form ofmortgages on their homesor farms.li Got'- crnment debt was almostnegligible, accounting- forless thati10 per cent of total debt. andmost of it was owed bystate and local govemmen
Nonfinancial businessenterprises were still themost important group of debtors in 1929,hut their share haddeclined toabout two-fifths The shareof financialintermediaries had risenbut was still tinderone-thirdwhile that ofindividualsremained tin- changed at aboutone-fifth. Governmentdebt nowaccounted for fully one.tenthof the total, dividedabout equallybetweei1 the federalgovernment and state and localgovernmeflf
By 1949, nonfinancialbusiness had fallento third placeamong the four main debtorgl-oups and accounted foronly aboutone- sixth of the totaldebt. The share ofindividuals had alsodeclined to only one-tenth.In contrast boththe governmentand financial intermediariesnow accounted forat least one-third oftotal debt outstang Themovements of governmentand financialinter- mediaries' debtare, of course, at timesclosely related.The in- crease in thegovernmen'5 share in totaldebt reflectsprimarily the large-scaleborrowing duringWorld War IIand secondari'y during the thirties;and it is theabsorption of thisadditional debt by financialintermediaries thatis largelyresponsible for their increasing share ofliabilities in totaldebt. It is notnecessary to study indetail the sharesof differentgroups in the increaseof the shareof all financialintermediaries' debt in the nationaltotal since tiletrends in thedistribution of debt are necessarilyvery similar to thosein the distributionof the ag- gregate assets of financialintermediariesamong the maingroups of institutionsother thanpersonal trustdepartmeits Itmay there- fore suceto recall that theliabilities ofinsurance institutions
The figures mightbe slightly largerif betterestimates were availableof open account trade debt andof debt amongIndividual5
86have increasedconsklcrably more rapidly than those of thebank-
ing system both between1900 and 1929 and between 1929and
1949, while those of otherfinancial intermediaries have increased
more rapidly thanthe total in the first half of theperiod but less
rapidly from 1929 to 1949. As aresult the share of theliabilities
of the banking system intotal debt outstanding did notincrease
at all from1900 to 1929 and rose only slightlyin the following
two decades,while that of insurance institutionsincreased consid-
erably in both periods.
The share of financialintermediaries in the total ofshort-term
liabilities outstanding in thenation has, of course,always been
considerably higher than theirshare in total liabilities sincefinan-
cial intermediaries haveraised only relatively smallamounts of
funds through bonds and mortgages.Indeed, their share in the
total long-term debt of thecountry has not exceeded afew per
cent at anybenchmark date and in 1949 wasbelow I per cent,
being essentially limited tothe bonds issued bycertain govern-
ment lending agencies,the land banks, and a fewinvestment com-
panies. If the liabilitiesof insurance organizations areregarded
as of ashort-term nature,financial intermediaries have atmost
benchmark dates accountedfor more than halfof the country's
short-term debt.
Equity
The determinationof share of financialintermediaries in na-
tional equity isconsiderably more difficult,both conceptually and
practicallY than similarcalculations of assetsand liabilities.48
The first difficultyarises in defining theequity of financial inter-
mediaries. This is arelatively noncontroversialmatter only for
financial intermediariesin corporate form,although even for
these a decision mustbe made whetherequity is to bemeasured
in terms of bookvalue or market valueof the stock. Whatexactly
is to be regarded asthe "equity" ofmutual savings banks,credit
unions, savings andloan associations,mutual insuranCe companiCS
' Sonic of the difficulties
discussed hese with respect toequity have already been
met with in the caseof liabilities but weredisregarded there because theywere of
little quantitative importancein relation to the aggregate.
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Igovet-nrncnt pension and trust funds, and privatepensionfund5 is far from clear. Obviously,measurement of equityOn a market
value basis iout of the question fur these illStjtUtjOflS.On a book
value basis we may take the legalisticj)osition of rcgardij1g
as equity everything that doeSnot COnStitute a definiteliability That, however, would include virtuallyall assets ofsavinosand loan associations and credit unionssince what iseconomicallya deposit with these institutionsis legally regardedas a share. Ho1
government pension and trust funds antiprivatepension funds would be treated froma strictly legalistic point of viewis douJ)[. ful. From that point ofview the rights ofbeneficiaries inPersonal trust departments certainlywould have to beregarded as being in the nature of equity.
In this situation itwould seem best to heguided byeconomic rather than by legalconsiderations and totreat all financialinter- mediaries, as faras possible, in analogy toCorporations Under this treatment the'equity'' of financialintermediaries willin- clitde only the bookor market value of thestock of financial intermediaries incorporate form. All assets ofprivate and gov- ernment insurance organizationsare regarded as balancedby liabilities to theirpolicyholders or otherbeneficiaries. Theassets of personaltrust departments,on the other hand,are treated as giving rise toan equivalent equity interestof the beneficiaries,
The second andmore difficult questionconcerns the national total of equity withwhich theaggregate equity of financialinter- mechiaries so definedmay be compared. Thesimplest solutionis to use national wealthas the measure of nationalequity. National wealth, however,is unsatisfactoryfor thispurpose since itis primarily the equityof ultimates,s.C.households,governments, and nOnprofitInstitutions Moreover,national wealth isgenerally calculated on thebasis ofcul-rdnt values, while theequity of financialintermediaries is,as a rule, basedon 1)00k values. A concepttiah1' moreappropriate nationaltotal is thesuni of the equity of all businessenter1)rises, hut this isdilljcttlt to measure on a uniformbasis. Finallythere is thellarrow('r (Omllparison l) tWeen the equity ofall corporatiomi5and of Ihiancialintermediaries in corporateform.
88The equity of financial intermediarieshas been quite small
compared to total national equity, inwhatever way the latter is
defined. (See Table 21.) We may,therefore, be satisfied with two
rough indications of the ratio betweentle Iwo.
TABLE21
Shore of Financial Intermediaries in Equity
Excluding personal trust departments.
bIncludes in addition to commercialbanks, property insurancecompanies and in.
vestment companies covesed incolumn 1, net worth of savingsand loan associations,
credit unions, Federal Reservebanks, land banks, and governmentlending institu-
tions; undistributcd surplusof mutual savings banks, lifeinsurance companies, and
fraternal insurance organizations.
Column
1From R. \V. Goldsmith, AStudyOjSaving in tile United States(Princeton
University Press), Vol. III, PartI.
2AppendiX Table A-2.
SDetailed tables in Appendix toforthcoming full study.
4 From Appendix to theforthcomnisig lull study.
5Column 3 divided by column1.
6Column 4 divided by column2.
1. The book valueof the equity offinancial intermediaries
(excluding personal trustdepartments) throughoutthe last fifty
years hashovered around 5 per centof national wealth.Personal
trust departmentsalone, however, haverepresented an approxi-








STOCK Alib Corps.FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
(market (book (market National Corporate
value) value) value) JVealth Equity
(billions of dollars) (per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1900 $87.7 $11.8 $2.9 $2.5 3.3 21.2
1912 165.2 32.2 5.8 5.3 3.5 16.5
1922 334.2 57.1 11.4 10.3 3.4 18.0
1929 439.1 149.6 23.1 21.3 5.3 14.2
1933 330.2 63.9 19.3 5.5 5.8 8.6
1939 395.6 82.3 21.5 9.9 5.4 12.0
1945 570.6 127.7 53.6 14.8 9.4 11.6
11.5
1949 898.2 131.6 57.4 15.1 6.490
2. Financial intermediariesin corporate form, primarilycom- mercial banks andproperty insurance companies, haveaccounted for as muchas 21 per cent of the market value of theequity of all
Corporations in 1900, but their sharedeclined rapidly to14 per cent in 1929 and has remainedat around 12 per cent duringthe last decade.
The proportion oftotal equity accounted for byfinancial inter-
mediaries is thus quite smalland is well below the shareof finan- cial intermediariesin virtually all types ofassets which they hold or their share in totalor short-term liabilities. Furthermorethe share fails to show theincreasing trendover the last half century
visible in most otherratios. The reason for thedifference in level is that equity,as here defined, constitutes onlya small proportion of the totalassets of financial intermediaries